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Asset prices have recently become a common topic in economic debate. Nevertheless,
much time has been spent in determining if they e®ectively exhibit a bubble component,
and not in examining whether asset prices a®ectively contain relevant information concern-
ing future market developments. This paper is a ¯rst e®ort in Colombia in this direction,
aimed towards the construction of early ¡ warning indicators using ¯nancial and real
variables. Results show evidence to support that there is relevant information embedded
in these series, as all indicators (except the new housing price indicator) show a signif-
icant deviation for the year(s) prior to the 98-99 crisis. Additionally, the exercises here
conducted show that the performance of asset price indicators is enhanced by including
credit and investment. When the early-warning indicators are on, the role of the policy
maker should be more active in the market; not necessarily in terms of altering interest
rates, but in communicating with market agents, promoting portfolio and perspective (i.e.
short and long-term) diversi¯cation and urging ¯nancial agents to make the best use of
the tools that are available to them.
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11 Introduction
Asset price bubbles are amongst the most talked-about yet misunderstood topics in economics.
Theoretical researchers debate between rational, nonrational or even non-existent bubbles,
while empiricists tackle the issue with state-of-the-art econometric tools yielding mixed results.
A bubble is usually de¯ned as the component of asset prices that cannot be accounted for
by fundamentals1. A rational bubble arises when agents are willing to pay a higher price than
the \fundamental price" because they believe that they can sell the asset at an even higher
price in the future (Gurkaynak (2005)). A nonrational bubble is de¯ned as a rapid upward
price movement, based on exaggerated beliefs about future outcomes (e.g. company earnings
or the impact of a new technology), followed by a collapse (Meltzer (2003)).
Some theorists have also developed behavioral models with rational expectations which
allow for explaining price behavior without bubble components. In a nut-shell, these mod-
els assume expectations are based on imperfect knowledge of future fundamentals, so that
investors may overestimate potential income °ows (i.e. earnings) and hence asset prices.
As agents acquire new information, they correct their initial forecasts, altering their invest-
ment/consumption decisions and changing asset prices (Meltzer (2003)).
On the empirical side, tests are usually constructed for rational bubbles, given the relative
knowledge of researchers on testing the present value model of asset prices. Nonetheless,
results vary and there does not appear to be a general consensus regarding a speci¯c empirical
test of bubbles. In fact, there is not even a common agreement on the interpretation of a
rejection of the no-bubbles hypothesis; while some argue this is proof of the existence of
bubbles others attribute this to a failure of the model in another dimension (e.g. misspeci¯ed
fundamentals). In the end, the choice between bubble solutions and a misspeci¯ed model of
price behavior remains a matter of belief.
The bottom-line is that even if there is no scienti¯c proof of the existence of bubbles, the
current volatility in asset prices worldwide has sprang a newfound interest in the subject.
The typical questions found in the literature usually read something like: How should
bubbles be measured? Can they be measured? Are they rational or nonrational bubbles?
Do bubbles exist? Are these the most relevant questions for decision-makers? Probably not.
Financial instability usually arises from a combination of economic imbalances and not a
single event. That is, large increases in asset prices by themselves do not necessarily lead to
widespread instability in the ¯nancial system. Rather, an increase in asset prices, rapid credit
expansions and high levels of investment, occurring simultaneously, could lead to potential
problems (Borio and Lowe (2002, 2003)). Thus, the relevant question for policymakers is not
whether bubbles exist, but rather if the observed behavior in asset prices, along with other
¯nancial and real variables, is indicative of possible future imbalances.
In such spirit, we use information on the most relevant asset prices, credit and investment
to construct early-warning indicators of ¯nancial distress, as suggested by Borio and Lowe
(2002, 2003). The idea behind these indicators is simply to observe the deviation of each
series to its long-term trend, and determine whether imbalances occur after such deviations
overcome a speci¯c threshold. Although analyzing the deviation of a variable to its trend is
1Fundamentals are the discounted value of expected future income °ows.
2by no means revolutionary (the loans to GDP ratio being one of the most common), analyzing
real and ¯nancial variables jointly as early warning indicators of ¯nancial distress has only
become popular more recently. This is mainly due to the fact that although asset prices
have made several appearances on historical accounts of ¯nancial instability, their empirical
relationship with credit and aggregate demand has been less studied.
However, there have been various attempts in identifying the link between asset prices,
¯nancial stability and monetary policy. Some authors argue that a responsible monetary
policy leads to low in°ation, induces stable asset prices and e±cient levels of liquidity, reduces
investors' uncertainty (by promoting a sounder macro environment) thus allowing for optimum
consumption and investment decisions. On the other hand, some economists have began to
realize that ¯nancial instability (and large asset price swings) can develop in periods of low
in°ation. A credible monetary policy results in low in°ation expectations, meaning it takes
longer for higher demand to translate into prices. As agents' expenditure increases, there is a
higher demand for loans and banks increase their lending. Debt-¯nanced spending may lead
to a faster rise in asset prices, which does not immediately translate to higher in°ation. The
inverse is also true. There could be high in°ation under a stable ¯nancial environment. Under
this scenario, a rise in interest rates, consistent with the in°ation goal, could lead to ¯nancial
instability by increasing the burden of outstanding °oating-rate debt and most importantly
creating signi¯cant wealth e®ects through portfolio-valuation losses caused by the fall in the
price of tradable assets (this is especially relevant in markets where balance sheets are marked-
to-market), thus altering investment/consumption decisions. In other words, there is room
for important trade-o®s between monetary and ¯nancial stability.
The above does not mean that policymakers are thus left with their hands tied. In the ¯rst
place, it would be foolish to overlook that asset prices contain a large amount of information
from which policymakers can reap incredible bene¯ts2. On second place, even if there is no
consensus on the exact link between ¯nancial and monetary stability there does seem to be a
convergence on some of the actions that should be undertaken by policymakers to reduce large
asset-price swings. In short, these are aimed towards reducing information asymmetries in the
market, promoting the long-term structure of certain speci¯c institutional investors' portfolio
(e.g. pension funds) as well as the diversi¯cation and sophistication of risk management tools.
Additionally, they should promote deeper and wider capital markets to increase the universe
of ¯nancial assets available to investors and encourage a closer monitoring of ¯nancial markets.
Both the retrieval of information embedded in asset prices as well as possible policy ac-
tions to help move ¯nancial markets into a stronger form of market e±ciency (i.e. more
shock-resistant) are crucial to policymakers worldwide. This is even more so in a country
like Colombia, because emerging markets which are moving towards a model of ¯nancial in-
tegration are more vulnerable to the adverse e®ects that speculative capital °ows have on the
¯nancial cycle. When there are waves of optimism on the real sector, credit grows spectacu-
larly, there is a tendency to overinvest in physical capital, asset prices hike and consumption
soars as well. All this factors lead to higher economic growth and a valorization of domestic
assets, increasing foreign investors appetite for the latter. This leads to higher capital in°ows,
which in Colombia are highly (and positively) correlated with credit (see Villar et. al. (2005)),
2Developments in asset prices and credit may have an impact on in°ation and are therefore important for
central banks when they set interest rates. Additionally, asset prices may be indicative of future developments
in output and demand.
3thus exacerbating the business cycle. When expectations change (e.g. due to new informa-
tion on future fundamentals) and agents correct their initial forecasts, the wave of optimism
crumbles, imbalances are corrected abruptly and there are perverse e®ects both on ¯nancial
markets and the real economy (Collyns and Senhadji (2003)).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presented a quick introduction to the subject
at hand and its relevance to policymakers. Section 2 provides an overview of the empirical
literature aimed at detecting asset price bubbles, while section 3 presents and overview of the
implications of the latter on monetary policy. Empirical exercises with Colombian data on
asset prices, credit and investment as early-warning indicators are carried out in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Bubbles in the Literature3
Econometric tests for identifying bubbles have proven to be fairly ine®ective. In principle, such
tests are aimed towards rejecting the present value model (or market fundamental model),









where Pt denotes the asset price at time t, r is a one period risk-free market rate and
Et(dt+i) is the expected value of future income °ows generated by the asset (the market
fundamental component)4.
A rejection of the model in equation (2.1) implies there is an unexplained component
of price behavior which could be accounted for by bubbles. Nonetheless, this component
can also be attributed to a misspeci¯cation of the fundamentals in the model. Hence, the
conclusions which can be derived from such tests end up re°ecting the personal preferences
of the researcher between bubbles and fundamentals-based explanations of price movements.
Even so, many researchers have focused on explaining the dynamics of price behavior and
the existence or nonexistence of bubbles with econometric-based tests. Shiller (1981) uses
variance bound tests in order to explain the variation in observed prices5. These tests are
based on the idea that observed prices are formed according to equation (2.1) and that there
exists an ex-post rational price which depends on actual income °ows (and not expected) of
the form:
3The review concerning econometric tests on asset price bubbles is based on a thorough overview of the
literature done by Gurkaynak (2005). All the tests covered are related with rational bubbles.
4In the case where P is the price of stock, d would denote future dividends; in the case where P denotes
housing prices d would denote rental °ows; whilst in the case where P denotes the price of a bond, d would
stand for coupon payments.
5The author uses S&P500 annual data for prices and dividends from 1871. This data set is used by most










where dt+i = [Et(dt+i + ²t+i)] (2.3)
The main assumption is that the variance of P¤
t (V (P¤
t )) is greater or at the least equal
to that of Pt (V (Pt)). This is due to the fact that observed prices (Pt) are based only on
expected income °ows, while the ex-post rational price (P¤
t ) includes the variance that future
forecast errors imply6. Thus, the test consists of verifying if observed prices e®ectively have a
lower variance than the ex-post rational price. If the variance bound is violated, this is taken
as evidence that observed prices do not follow equation (2.1) and so the present value model
is rejected7.
In his empirical application, Shiller (1981) concludes that the high volatility in observed
prices (i.e. violation of the variance bound) is due to misspeci¯cations in the general present
value model, whereas Tirole (1985) suggests that the variance bound violation may be due to
the existence of bubbles. More recently, Cochrane (1992) explicitly tests for bubbles using the
variance of the price/dividend ratio8. He uses di®erent discount rate models and ¯nds that
the variance bound is satis¯ed for all the di®erent speci¯cations (i.e. no evidence of bubbles).
The author goes one step further and carries out variance decomposition exercises on
the price/dividend ratio for each discount rate model. He ¯nds that there exist unobserved
discount rate processes that explain the variance of the ratio, yet the discount rate proxies9
used in his paper do not satisfy the variance decomposition. Cochrane (1992) then shows that
the time-varying discount rate processes needed to explain the variance of the ratio do not
require outrageous behavior. Thus, there is no case for bubbles, but rather the challenge of
¯nding successful measures (i.e. proxies) of discount rates.
West (1987) introduces a di®erent approach to test for bubble existence, by explicitly
putting a bubble in the alternative hypothesis and testing for model speci¯cation and the
no-bubbles hypothesis sequentially. This method compares two estimates of the impact of










Et(dt+ij­t) = ¹ ¯dt; (2.4)








6To see this more clearly, note that equation (2.3) implies that actual income °ows are equal to expected
income °ows plus a variable term that captures the unforecastable component of income °ows.
7The implementation of the test is considerably more complicated than in theory, since the values of dt out
to in¯nity are unrealized. Generally, the current date is taken as a terminal point in time and the P
¤ series is
constructed recursively using observed values of dt.
8The author utilizes annual data from the New York Stock Exchange for the period 1926-1988.
9The author uses the following discount rate models: 1) discount rate = constant, 2) discount rate =
reference return plus risk premium, 3) discount rate = return, 4) consumption-based discount rates and 5) the
case where no restrictions are placed on discount rates and these are treated as unobserved.
10See Appendix A for a detailed derivation of this variable.
5and the Á coe±cient is estimated from a prior regression where income °ows are assumed
to follow a stationary autoregressive process of the form:
dt = Ádt¡1 + ut (2.5)
where ut is a white noise variable. However, the actual price does contain a bubble
component and can be expressed as:
Pt = ¯dt + Bt (2.6)
If there is no bubble in the data, regressing Pt on dt should give an estimate of ¯ (^ ¯) equal
to ¹ ¯. If these two di®er, it is possible to trace the discrepancy to bubbles or a bad speci¯cation
of the model. However, the implementation of the test has major inconveniences. First of all,
the tests show some inconsistency when a bubble is present (West (1987)) and it rejects the null
hypothesis (no bubbles) repeatedly when using small samples (Dezbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt
(1990)). Additionally, there is still the problem of interpreting the rejection of the no-bubbles
hypothesis, as it may be due to a misspeci¯cation of the model. As mentioned above, it is
possible to test between bubbles and model-related issues, but it is still very complicated to
test the model's speci¯cation for every possible contingency.
Finally, Flood et. al. (1994) stress that even if no misspeci¯cations where found with the
existing tests, a rejection of the no-bubbles hypothesis may still be due to factors di®erent
from a bubble. For example, the possibility that agents assign a small probability to an event
that has a signi¯cant impact on asset prices. Their expectations will thus be embedded on
prices, independent on the event occurring or not. If it fails to materialize, the observed e®ect
on prices will be very similar to that of a bubble.
Intuitively, the methods described above try to correctly specify the present value model,
and if fundamentals cannot explain prices then it must be due to the presence of a bubble
(however, as mentioned above, it could also be due to a misspeci¯cation of the model).
Integration and cointegration based tests try to address this problem by exploiting the
theoretical characteristics of bubbles. Speci¯cally, Diba and Grossman (1988b) rule out the
possibility of rational bubbles starting at any given moment in time, thus, if they exist now











Et(dt+i + ot) (2.7)
where ot denotes the fundamentals which cannot be observed by the econometrician11. The
fact that a bubble cannot pop and restart implies that a bubble is generated by a nonstationary
process, despite the number of di®erences applied to the series. Given this, the test is pretty
straightforward. In the absence of bubbles, prices should be stationary when di®erenced the
same number of times needed to make income °ows stationary. Also, Diba and Grossman
11Additionally, such unobserved variables are assumed to be less nonstationary than income °ows. That is,
if income °ows have to be di®erenced three times to be stationary, ot has to be di®erenced at most three times.
6(1988a) observe that equation (2.7) imposes an equilibrium relationship between the two
variables, and so assuming there are no bubbles and that ot is stationary, prices and income
°ows should be cointegrated.
However, these tests do not come without criticism. First o®, the rejection of the no-
bubbles hypothesis implies the presence of something non-stationary in price behavior. This
does not necessarily imply a bubble, but a violation on the assumptions made on the unob-
served fundamentals of the model. On a second note, even when the model does not reject
the aforementioned hypothesis, this cannot be taken as proof of the inexistence of bubbles.
At the most, it can be said that a bubble generated by an explosive process is not present in
the price series. As Evans (1991) points out, it is possible to have a bubble that collapses to
a small nonzero value (never actually reaching zero) and then begins increasing again. This
special case of a periodically collapsing bubble satis¯es the Diba and Grossman (1988b) crit-
icism of bubbles being unable to restart since it actually never pops. The author shows that
unit root tests have trouble detecting such bubbles because their behavior resembles that of
a stationary process.
After Evans (1991) criticism, researchers looked for new and more complex ways to test
for periodically collapsing bubbles. Researchers' attention thus turned towards regime switch-
ing models, where the expanding and collapsing periods where treated as di®erent regimes.
Nonetheless, the exact switching model chosen by the researcher had signi¯cant impact on
the results12.
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) propose a di®erent type of bubble phenomenon which they call
intrinsic bubbles. This term is used because the bubble depends (in a non-linear deterministic
way) on fundamentals13. The bubble component will, therefore, remain unaltered as long as
fundamentals are constant, and will increase or decrease along with the level of income °ows.
In addition, the intrinsic bubble can cause prices to overreact to changes in fundamentals (i.e.
deviate from the fundamental price P
f
t ). In this setup, the fundamental price and bubble

















where Dt are the income °ows and Bt is the bubble. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) show that
a non-linear function of the form:
B(Dt) = cD¸
t c > 0;¸ > 1 (2.10)
satis¯es equation (2.9) and implies that the bubble process depends entirely on the level
of income °ows. The authors assume log income °ows follow a random walk with a drift
parameter ¹ and a conditional variance ¾2 such that:
12A striking example is presented by Gurkaynak (2005). Van Norden and Vigfusson (1998) use two di®erent
regime switching bubble tests on S&P 500 data and get contrary results on the existence of bubbles.
13In their paper, the relationship is between bubbles and the level of dividends.
7dt = ¹ + dt¡1 + ³t (2.11)
where dt are log income °ows and ³t is a normal random variable with conditional mean
zero and variance ¾2. Under this model of behavior for income °ows and assuming that Dt is
observed at the beginning of the period, the bubble solution ^ Pt is given by:
^ Pt = P
f
t + B(Dt) = kDt + cD¸
t (2.12)
where k = e(¹+¾2=2)
(1+r)¡e(¹+¾2=2) is a constant term14. It is clear from equation (2.12) that
prices overreact to changes in income °ows under the presence of bubbles compared to the
`fundamentals' only solution. In the latter, @P
f
t =@Dt = k while in the former @Pt=@Dt =
k + c¸D¸¡1
t ; with c > 0.
Under the (null) hypothesis of no intrinsic bubbles, the `bubble' solution is equal to the
fundamental price:






Equation (2.13) implies both a linear relationship between prices and income °ows and
a constant price/income °ows ratio (i.e. equal to k). It also shows that the latter will be a
function of the trend growth and variance parameters (¹ and ¾2, respectively) from the model
in equation (2.11) as well as of the risk-free interest rate (r).
The introduction of bubbles changes these conditions by imposing a nonlinear relationship




= k + cD¸¡1
t + "t (2.14)
where "t is a well behaved error term. Henceforth, the test is intuitive, a regression where
the price/income °ows ratio is the dependent variable is ran against a constant and the income
°ows variable. If the only signi¯cant regressor in the estimation is the constant, this will be
indicative of a lack of bubbles in the data. Note that if a non-linear relationship is found
between the dependent variable and income °ows, this will be taken as evidence of a bubble.
However, as Gurkaynak (2005) asserts, this is only because the model is assumed to be linear.
What if the true relationship is not?
In answering this question, regime switching models got their second chance on tackling
the issue of bubbles. Dri±ll and Sola (1998) characterize the law of motion of income °ows in a
di®erent way to Froot and Obstfeld (1991) (i.e. they assume a regime switching model for the
income °ows ). The authors ¯nd that allowing for both switching fundamentals and bubbles
in the model causes the contribution of the latter in explaining the price/income °ows ratio
to fall dramatically. More importantly, the ¯t of a model with switching fundamentals and
no bubbles is practically the same as the one with intrinsic bubbles and no regime switches.
14See Appendix A for a detailed derivation of this variable.
8The bottom line is that there is certainly something non-linear in the data which is not easily
attributable to bubbles.
All the tests surveyed above, despite having di®erent econometric techniques, share a
common characteristic. They are all, in essence, a test on the present value model against an
unidenti¯ed alternative (i.e. the bubble). Wu (1997) takes this interpretation of the bubble
literally and tries to estimate a series of the bubble component. He estimates the bubble as
an unobserved variable in the price generation equation (i.e. everything that is not explained








Et(dt+i) + Bt (2.15)
The author ¯nds that the unexplained component e®ectively explains a large portion of
the movement in prices. However, his series of the bubble often takes negative values, which
is a violation of one of the few strong theoretical properties of bubbles (i.e. that if one exists,
it can never be negative)15. Therefore, his measure of bubbles must clearly be capturing
other components di®erent from a bubble (e.g. a failure of the model due to misspeci¯ed
fundamentals).
Empirical research has not only focused on econometric tests. Other studies have used
rational expectations general equilibrium models (McGrattan and Prescott (2003)) in order to
explain possible price behavior. Nonetheless, such models are not devoid of criticism. Mainly,
because they do not converge to a unique stationary equilibrium or dynamic equilibrium
path. In fact, the bubble solutions (when prices do not converge to ¯nite values) arise among
the plausible multiple equilibria these models have. As Meltzer (2003) notes, such solutions
may be due to the speci¯c assumptions made in the model16 and additionally, they do not
necessarily imply the existence of a bubble (i.e. all explosive movements are not bubbles)17.
The state of the art in empirical tests has yet to deliver a useful asset price model that
separates the various components that drive price behavior (Meltzer (2003)). Essentially, all
models fail because expectations are not observable, so assumptions must be made concerning
how they are measured. Ultimately, this means that the so-called fundamental value is based
on beliefs rather than on data.
3 Implications of Bubbles on Monetary Policy
3.1 To intervene or not to intervene
Although there seems to be an agreement regarding the relevance that asset price develop-
ments have over ¯nancial stability and economic growth, the debate concerning the optimum
intervention of economic authorities to prevent strong swings in these prices prevails.
15See Diba and Grossman (1988b) for an analytical derivation of this property.
16For example, assuming there does not exists an in¯nitely lived rational policymaker.
17Meltzer (2003) provides the case of Germany's hyperin°ation (1920-1923) as an example. The Reichsbank
allowed monetary acceleration and it was hence rational for agents to expect price acceleration as a response
to higher liquidity. This is a typical case of price explosion that does not imply a bubble.
9One branch of the literature supports the hypothesis that expansive policies may com-
pensate the recessive e®ects of large swings in asset prices. As Meltzer (2003) notes, asset
price declines need not be followed by output or consumption recessions. By analyzing sev-
eral bubble episodes, the author states that the di®erent e®ects that high asset prices have
on an economy are explained by the policy actions implemented by the relevant authorities.
Moreover, Cecchetti et. al. (2003) suggest that even though asset prices should not belong
to the objective function of the Central Bank, misalignments in these prices must be taken
into account. The main reason is that asset price bubbles lead to increases in real output and
in°ation, followed by sharp falls. The authors suggest these e®ects can be o®set with modest
movements on the interest rates by policymakers. Nevertheless, they clarify that the decision
of reacting to asset price changes should be dependent on the context on which these occur,
and not be a mechanical and symmetric response18.
Given that monetary authorities act mainly by altering a short-term interest rate that
directly a®ects the interbank overnight rate, this literature distinguishes three channels by
which monetary policy can a®ect asset valuations19. First, changes in interest rates may a®ect
individual expectations about future behavior of economic growth. Second, monetary policy
a®ects agents' set of discount factors. Finally, they may induce portfolio shifts that a®ect
assets' relative prices20.
On the other hand, a branch of the literature states that central banks should not react to
changes in asset prices. They support their position by arguing that it would be harmful for
economic stability to introduce such a volatile indicator into policy decisions. Additionally,
asset prices cannot be determined scienti¯cally: as Trichet (2003) argues, what matters is not
only the asset price level per se, or the pace of its change, but also its deviation from a highly
hypothetical fundamental value, which is hard to determine.
Another important argument to remain extremely cautious about monetary policy inter-
vention is moral hazard problems: if individuals expect intervention they may take riskier
projects in order to magnify their expected returns because they internalize that their losses
are limited.
Moreover, Goodfriend (2003) advices that monetary policy should not react directly to as-
set prices because there can be no theoretical presumption on the correlation between interest
rates and equity price movements, and hence on the overall e®ectiveness of the intervention.
3.2 What can Monetary Authorities do?
Although the debate concerning intervention seems endless, there are certain points in which
researchers and academics have reached an agreement. For instance, there is consensus re-
garding the reasons that explain the abnormal behavior of asset prices in the last years. Three
facts can be clearly distinguished. First, agents have increased their interest in short-term
results. This has magni¯ed price volatility by amplifying the impact of any new information.
Second, markets have developed mimetic or herding behavior. That is, agents prefer to be
18This decision should contemplate all relevant asset prices, which in their paper include equity and housing
prices.
19These channels are exposed in further detail by Trichet (2003).
20There are other indirect channels such as wealth e®ects in investment and consumption that may a®ect
prices via households intertemporal smoothing behavior.
10wrong along with everybody else rather than taking the risk of being right alone. This type of
conduct leads to massive earnings or losses. Finally, converging risk management techniques
have led to contemporaneous homogeneous responses by di®erent market players, increasing
the size of trading volumes and magnifying initial shocks.
The above implies that monetary authorities must safeguard ¯nancial stability by pro-
moting diversity in ¯nancial markets, which in turn may prevent asset price swings. In order
to achieve this objective, monetary policy should focus on i) strengthening market trans-
parency, ii) preserving the long term perspective of some investors (e.g. pension funds), and
iii) promoting the diversi¯cation of risk management tools of ¯nancial institutions.
Market transparency reduces the mimetic behavior of agents in the market. By reducing
incomplete information and uncertainty it gives con¯dence to investors regarding their own
decisions. In this way, an agent would no longer prefer to follow bigger participants, rather
than carry on his own analysis, if he believes that all market participants have access to the
same information. Additionally, transparency enables better di®erentiation of a borrower's
creditworthiness21.
Furthermore, when economic authorities preserve the long-term perspective of pension
funds and insurance companies they compensate for the \short-termism" of other agents,
thus reducing the impact of new information in the price formation process. Lastly, diver-
sifying the risk management tools of ¯nancial institutions, so that they include more than
the massively adopted Value-at-Risk (VaR) measure, can help reduce the mimetic behavior
observed in markets. Authorities must promote the use of stress testing techniques by all ¯-
nancial institutions, because their results are inherently more diversi¯ed than those of the VaR
approach22, as well as advancing towards more sophisticated risk-measures, such as Expected
Shortfall (ES), Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and Spectral Risk Measures (SRM)23.
Monetary authorities may also openly promote the deepening of existing capital markets
and the creation of new ones. For example, in Colombia few ¯rms are listed in the Colom-
bian Stock Exchange24, and even fewer issue corporate bonds as means of obtaining ¯nancial
resources. Policy maker's must strive to create the necessary conditions (i.e. a sound macro-
economic environment, low and stable interest rates, low in°ation, quicker and more reliable
information systems, e±cient legal systems, tax incentives) for ¯rms to e®ectively consider
exploring these new markets. The former would allow for a larger universe of ¯nancial assets
available to investors, thus reducing the high concentration and homogeneity present today
in local investors' portfolios, which increases systemic risk.
Other policies that authorities may apply to promote ¯nancial diversity are25:
21As Trichet (2003) mentions, this may prevent that when one big ¯rm has di±culties all the other ¯rms
that belong to that speci¯c sector face credit restrictions.
22This is simply due to the way in which a stress test is conducted. Each institution, by endogenously
choosing the shocks for the stress test, is revealing its individual perception of an exceptional event in a given
market or over a given portfolio of assets. This alone implies a diversity not found in the VaR analysis, where
the parameters used are usually calibrated with similar data sets (Trichet (2003)).
23An intuitive and practical exposition of these risk measures can be found in Dowd (2005).
24As of July 2006, there are 8980 listed ¯rms of a total of over 20,000 ¯rms who actively report their balance
sheet to the relevant authorities.
25These policies are part of President Bush's 10 Point plan on ¯nancial disclosure. For more information see
Kroszner (2003).
11² Require companies to disclose periodical information necessary to assess a company's
value (that does not compromise competitive secrets). The periodicity of the disclosures
could vary depending on the market.
² Each investor should have prompt access to critical information.
² Chief Executive O±cers who clearly abused their power should lose their right to serve
in any corporate leadership position.
² Enhancing the accountability of corporate leaders to restore trust in the system.
Moreover, there is consensus over the idea that asset prices o®er useful information to
monetary authorities in the short-run (Goodfriend (2003)), especially because they have im-
portant consequences over ¯nancial markets. This idea is central to the core of this paper,
because it implies that observing ¯nancial series may give policy makers vital information
regarding the future development of certain segments (or in some cases the whole) of the
¯nancial system. This means that a central bank should use the information that these vari-
ables contain in order to ensure and promote the stability of ¯nancial markets. In the next
section, indicators that may exploit such information and make it useful for political purposes
are presented.
4 Empirical Exercises
4.1 What can be done
Given the aforementioned problems with empirical tests on the existence of asset price bubbles
discussed in Section 2, this paper takes a di®erent direction when tackling the issue at hand.
Following the spirit of Borio and Lowe (2002, 2003), the central question in this analysis
is not whether bubbles exist or not, but rather how much information can be derived from
asset prices and other real and ¯nancial variables concerning ¯nancial instability26. From
a policymaker's perspective, this is probably the relevant issue anyway; even if the bubble
question is interesting in its own right, knowing what combination of events in the real and
¯nancial sectors increase the probability of possible risks materializing is even more so.
Historical experience has taught us that ¯nancial distress generally arises as a combination
of economic imbalances which unwind simultaneously. In this sense, hikes and declines in asset
prices, along with rapid credit expansion27 and - in some cases - above-average capital accu-
mulation, rather than any of these alone, are the most common symptoms of such scenarios.
Accordingly, they are an indication of an increase in the likelihood of possible imbalances.
Therefore, in what follows we seek to construct what can be called an Early-Warning
Financial Imbalance Indicator using ex ante Colombian data on credit, investment and asset
26This approach was ¯rst proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
27Much debate exists concerning the criteria that de¯nes adverse credit growth. In this paper, when we refer
to rapid credit growth we do not think of a higher equilibrium growth level, but rather an expansion related to
increased market liquidity, a relaxation in risk assessment and monitoring standards, and indebtment decisions
above actual repayment capacities. Hilbers et. al. (2005) identify an expansion above 20% in real terms as
worrying for countries with low credit to GDP ratios (i.e. below 30%). Credit in Colombia grew 26.5% in real
terms during 2006, and the credit/GDP ratio was slightly above 30% for the ¯rst time in over 5 years.
12prices28. To build this indicator, we utilize quarterly data that covers the period between
December 1994 and December 200629. The idea behind these indicators is to measure the
deviation of each variable from its long-term trend, and then determine if an imbalance was
e®ectively observed after such deviations overcome a speci¯c threshold value30. If the above
occurs, then the deviations of the variables from their long-run tendencies (which we refer to
as the gap in what follows) can be seen as an ex ante indicator of possible ¯nancial distress.
The above implies that our indicators focus on cumulative processes, as suggested by Borio
and Lowe (2002, 2003), since a large gap can develop through either one year of very rapid
growth in the relevant variable, or as the result of a number of years of above trend growth.
We also follow the authors in that we consider joint indicators, to see which combination of
real and ¯nancial variables provide the most useful signals. Finally, we take into consideration
di®erent forecast horizons to recognize the di±culty of predicting the exact time of a ¯nancial
imbalance.
Before explaining the way in which the indicators were constructed and the variables used,
a simple caveat concerning the threshold values is necessary. Although highly sophisticated
methods could have been used in order to determine the optimal threshold values, the ap-
proach followed here is a parsimony-criteria. This is done for two reasons. First of all, because
it is signi¯cantly easier to calculate. Secondly, because we are interested in constructing an
ex ante indicator for policymakers which provides them with the largest amount of useful
information possible. We believe this information set includes di®erent early-warning sce-
narios under a relevant range of threshold values, rather than under one value alone. The
criteria used, therefore, is simply to observe for each individual gap the threshold value(s)
that is/(are) only exceeded during times of ¯nancial instability.
4.2 Calculating the Early-Warning Indicators
Following Borio and Lowe (2002, 2003) we calculate the ratio of loans31 to gross domestic
product (GDP)32, as well as the ratio of investments to GDP33. Additionally, we use three
asset price indexes: the general equity index, the new housing price index and an aggregate
price index (IGBC, IPVN for their Spanish initials and API, respectively)34.
Afterwards, we employ a Hodrick and Prescott ¯lter to obtain the long-run trend of these
28Intuitively, we want to calculate the various indicators using only information that would have been
available to the policymaker when determining whether or not a \boom" existed.
29The information was obtained from the Superintendencia Financiera (Financial Superintendency), DANE
(Department of National Statistics), DNP (Department of National Planning) and the Bolsa de Valores de
Colombia (Colombian Stock Exchange). The Superintendencia Financiera is in charge of ¯nancial regulation
and supervision in Colombia.
30Following Borio and Lowe (2002, 2003), we utilize various threshold levels in our indicators. The idea is
to try and ¯nd the threshold value that best identi¯es actual imbalance periods whilst minimizing the number
of false alarms i.e. the number of wrongly predicted crises.
31The loan series includes mortgage, consumer and commercial loans.
32This ratio is also suggested by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gourinchas et. al. (2001), and Sopanha
(2006), among others.
33All the variables here used are in real terms.
34IGBC is constructed by the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (www.bvc.com.co) and IPVN is constructed
by DNP (www.dnp.gov.co). Appendix B carefully explains the construction of the aggregate price index,
calculated at Banco de la Rep¶ ublica (Central Bank of Colombia).
13variables35. Subsequently, we calculate the deviation of each series with respect to its trend.
We shall from this point on refer to these deviations as the credit gap, investment gap, equity
gap, housing gap and API gap. Figure 1 plots the percentage gap for each of the series
considered36; 37. The shaded region corresponds to the crisis period (i.e. 98-99).
4.3 Results
As Figure 1 reveals, the credit, investment, equity and API gap present high deviations from
their long-term trend for the year prior to and/or during the ¯nancial crisis of 1998-199938.
However, the same is not true for the housing gap which does not show a high gap for the
year before or during the crisis, but rather 3 years earlier (i.e. 1995). This could mean one
of two things. Either that housing prices are not a good early-warning indicator, or on the
contrary, they are the best early-warning indicator, because they predict the imbalance ¯rst.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the credit gap, equity gap and API gap showed
somewhat similar deviations during the pre-crisis period and the ¯rst quarter of 2006. How-
ever, they diverge signi¯cantly starting the second quarter and up until the end of the year,
with the loans to GDP ratio registering its highest deviations (over 10%) with respect to its
trend, while both equity prices and the API presented important reductions in theirs (around
20 percentage points). This is not surprising if one keeps in mind that credit grew over 20%
in real terms during 2006 (GDP grew 6.8%), a level that has already began to worry super-
visory authorities as well as the Central Bank. This has led to important monetary measures
to slow-down the rapid credit expansion (interest rate hikes, marginal reserve requirements,
among others) and the implementation of a new credit-risk model to enhance the current risk
measures39. The fall in the API and equity prices is explained by the high volatility experi-
enced in local markets during the second quarter of 2006, which increased certain investors'
risk aversion and adversely a®ected their portfolio position in these assets (e.g. pension funds,
stock brokers, investment funds, among others).
35The ¯lter assumes that the tendency of a series (i.e the long-term component) is determined by technological
changes, demographic changes, factor productivity, etc. Thus, variations in the aggregate demand explain the
short-run behavior of the series. Therefore, a series can be seen as a combination of two components: the
long-term supply component or tendency and the short-term demand component, also called cycle. Under this
approach, any series (xt) can be written as the sum of a trend (gt) and a cyclical component (ct):
xt = gt + ct;t = 1;:::;T








[(gt+1 ¡ gt) ¡ (gt ¡ gt¡1)]
2
36A gap of 1.2 implies a deviation of 20% between the series and its trend. In other words, the series' value
is 20% greater than the long-run trend value.
37Appendix C includes the graphs for each analyzed series along with the long-term component.
38This crisis was the must pronounced shock the Colombian economy has su®ered in the last century, and is
actually the only crisis in our data set.
39The new model is called SARC (for its spanish initials) and is currently operating only for commercial
loans. The idea is to extend it to consumption loans by 2008. The central idea behind the model is for banks
to have higher provisioning levels during the ascending part of the economic cycle so as to create a reserve
fund for the \bad" times. More on this model can be found at www.super¯nanciera.gov.co
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15The indicators that we intend to build must give an alert signal when the estimated gaps
overcome certain threshold values. In this way, we use a trial-and-error methodology to verify
the e±ciency of these indicators by checking whether they were able to predict the 1998-1999
economic crisis, how many false alarms are detected and whether each indicator identi¯es a
¯nancial imbalance as of December 2006. Obviously, the information may vary depending on
the threshold values that are chosen. We construct information tables for the alert signals
that the various indicators give for di®erent threshold values and time horizons, we also use
combinations of indicators. Results are presented in Figure 2.
In the tables presented, an imbalance is de¯ned as a period in which two or more quarters
present deviations above the chosen threshold level40 at the respective time horizon. A 1 year
horizon means that the predictive capacity of the indicator is validated only if the threshold
is surpassed the year immediately prior to the crisis; a 2 year horizon means it is validated
if the threshold is surpassed either the year before or two years before, and so on. For the
joint indicators, all the chosen variables must surpass the given threshold level in order for
the signal to be on.
The results from the individual indicators show no apparent surprises. All indicators cor-
rectly predict the 98-99 crisis at all horizons for the threshold values chosen, except housing
prices. The latter only identi¯es the crisis when a 3 year horizon is considered. Additionally,
only the credit indicator identi¯es an imbalance today, for all threshold values and horizons.
The investment, equity and API indicators identify it as well, but only with the lowest thresh-
old values considered. However, the equity and API indicators both give false signals when
such a threshold is chosen, which is certainly not a desired feature in these type of indicators.
The fact that both the API and equity indicators fail to predict an imbalance as of
December 2006 is directly related to the volatility period during the second quarter of 2006,
which reduced the deviation of each series to its respective trend41. However, it is interesting
to note that the deviations present during the latter half of 2005 and the ¯rst quarter of 2006
did e®ectively re°ect a possible imbalance in those markets; one which corrected abruptly
before the end of the ¯rst semester.
The joint indicators give diverse results. Not surprisingly, when an indicator involves
housing prices (Credit-Investment-Equity-Housing), it does not predict a ¯nancial imbalance
today and only correctly predicts the 98-99 crisis when a 3 year horizon is chosen. The
second joint indicator (Credit-Investment-Equity), correctly predicts the crisis period for the
threshold values and horizons considered. Moreover, including real variables along with equity
prices eliminates the false alarms present when the latter was taken individually. Whether
the indicator predicts an imbalance today remains a matter of choice between the two sets of
threshold values, and given uncertainty as to whether the next years will e®ectively feature a
¯nancial imbalance, a de¯nite choice cannot be made between the two. The same conclusion
holds for the Credit-Investment-API indicator, which is expected given the relative importance
of equity price movements in the behavior of this index.
Overall, a de¯nite conclusion cannot be made as to which indicator is best. However,
there is enough evidence in these indicators regarding the information that ¯nancial prices
40This is done in order to eliminate possible \noisy-signals" which arise due to high volatilities under very
speci¯c conjunctures in the market.
41Assuming that the deviation would have continued to increase had there been no such volatility in the
market.
16Figure 2: Early-Warning Indicators
Housing Gap
Threshold Value Horizon
1 year 2 years 3 years
4 N. of correctly predicted 0 0 1
N. of false alarms 2 2 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
5 N. of correctly predicted 0 0 0
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
6 N. of correctly predicted 0 0 0
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
Credit Gap
Threshold Value Horizon
1 year 2 years 3 years
4 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
6 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
7 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
Investment Gap
Threshold Value Horizon
1 year 2 years 3 years
5 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
9 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
10 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
² The threshold values are expressed as percentage deviations from the trend.
² The horizon is the number of years, prior to the imbalance period, considered to test the predictive
power of the indicator.
² An indicator is on if the deviation form the trend is above the chosen threshold level for two or more
consecutive quarters at the respective horizon.
17Equity Gap
Threshold Value Horizon
1 year 2 years 3 years
10 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 1 1 1
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
20 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
30 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
Aggregate Price Index (API)
Threshold Value Horizon
1 year 2 years 3 years
5 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 1 1 1
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
15 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
25 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
Joint Indicator (Credit-Investment-Equity-Housing)
Threshold Value Horizon
Credit Invest. Equity Housing 1 year 2 years 3 years
4 5 30 4 N. of correctly predicted 0 0 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
4 10 30 4 N. of correctly predicted 0 0 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
² The threshold values are expressed as percentage deviations from the trend.
² The horizon is the number of years, prior to the imbalance period, considered to test the predictive
power of the indicator.
² An indicator is on if the deviation form the trend is above the chosen threshold level for two or more
consecutive quarters at the respective horizon.
18Joint Indicator (Credit-Investment-Equity)
Threshold Value Horizon
Credit Invest. Equity 1 year 2 years 3 years
4 5 30 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
4 5 10 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
Joint Indicator (Credit-Investment-API)
Threshold Value Horizon
Credit Invest. API 1 year 2 years 3 years
4 5 15 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
4 5 5 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today Yes Yes Yes
4 10 5 N. of correctly predicted 1 1 1
N. of false alarms 0 0 0
Predicts imbalance today No No No
² The threshold values are expressed as percentage deviations from the trend.
² The horizon is the number of years, prior to the imbalance period, considered to test the predictive
power of the indicator.
² An indicator is on if the deviation form the trend is above the chosen threshold level for two or more
consecutive quarters at the respective horizon.
19(at least equity prices), among with other key variables, have in identifying possible future
imbalances (i.e. almost all indicators were on before the 98-99 crisis). Preliminary results
tend to favor both the Credit indicator and the joint indicators Credit-Investment-Equity
and Credit-Investment-API, as they all correctly predict the crisis period and make no false
alarms. The strong appeal of the latter lies in that they take into account ¯nancial and
real variables and theoretically include more market information. The future behavior of the
market (i.e. the occurrence or not of a ¯nancial imbalance) will more speci¯cally tell us which
threshold values work best; However, note that the realization of a future imbalance will make
a strong case for the Credit indicator, since it is the only early-warning signal that is on
regardless of the threshold value chosen. In this more than in any other case, only time will
tell.
5 Concluding Remarks
Asset prices have recently began to experience an academic boom, by becoming a common
topic in economic debate. However, much time has been spent in determining whether asset
prices e®ectively exhibit a bubble component, a question which although being theoretically
appealing deviates from the policy makers needs. For the latter, the fact that asset prices may
contain relevant information concerning future market developments is central, and should
therefore be exploited.
This paper is a ¯rst e®ort in this direction, aimed towards the construction of early-
warning indicators using ¯nancial (including asset prices) and real variables, both individually
and jointly. Results show evidence to support that there is relevant information embedded
in these series, as all indicators (except the new housing price indicator) reveal a signi¯cant
deviation for the year(s) prior to the 98-99 crisis (i.e. they are on). Additionally, the exercises
here conducted show that the performance of asset price indicators is enhanced by including
credit and investment, thus considering a wider range of market information. A de¯nite
conclusion regarding the best indicator (along with the best forecast horizon and threshold
level) will unfortunately depend on future market events. They will be the ultimate judge on
the predictive power of each indicator.
In terms of policy action, these indicators serve two purposes. Firstly, the individual indi-
cators help identify speci¯c markets where signs of possible imbalances are present. Secondly,
the joint indicators help to identify speci¯c moments when the promotion of a sounder ¯-
nancial system is most necessary (although by no means unique). When the early-warning
indicators are on, the role of the policy maker should be more active in the market. Not
necessarily in the traditional sense (i.e. altering interest rates), but in communicating with
market participants, promoting portfolio diversi¯cation, preserving the long-term perspective
of institutional investors (e.g. pension funds) and urging ¯nancial agents to make the best use
of the information (i.e. credit data bases and/or ¯rms balance sheets) and risk management
tools that are available to them42.
However, as mentioned above, these actions should not be the sole responsibility of the
imbalance periods, and should be regularly practiced by local authorities (i.e. prudential
42An excellent review of the prudential and supervisory measures that can and have been used by policy-
makers worldwide to undermine possible future ¯nancial imbalances is found in Hilbers et. al. (2005).
20regulation). Additionally, promoting the creation and deepening of capital markets to increase
portfolio diversi¯cation is a task that must not be left aside, because the future development
of a more shock-resistant ¯nancial system will largely depend on the level of maturity of the
system as a whole.
In this respect, the Banco de la Rep¶ ublica has done an immense e®ort, by openly collabo-
rating with the Superintendencia Financiera in the sophistication and implementation of risk
management tools to better face market, credit and liquidity risk. Additionally, by emphasiz-
ing in its periodical publications the need to advance in better credit-information data bases
for the ¯nancial system, alerting banks to keep a close watch on the level of non-performing
loans and analyzing asset prices in an e®ort to identify possible imbalances.
Future research in this ¯eld is more than necessary, especially since this is only a ¯rst
approach to obtaining all the relevant information for policy makers from asset prices. A
possible next step would be to follow Coudert and Gex (2006) in utilizing risk aversion in-
dicators (which are constructed using principal component analysis on ¯nancial price series)
to anticipate ¯nancial imbalances43. The important issue at hand is that all such e®orts, no
matter how sophisticated or practical, by being aimed towards granting monetary authorities
new tools to prevent pronounced periods of recession, are welcome.
43The authors use probability models to test this hypothesis.
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24A Appendix: Calculating ¹ ¯ and k
In Section 3 of this paper a solution for P
f














t = kDt; where k =
e(¹+¾2=2)
(1 + r) ¡ e(¹+¾2=2) (A.2)
In the ¯rst case, income °ows are modelled as dt = Ádt¡1+ut. In the second case log income
°ows are assumed to follow a random walk process with drift of the form dt = ¹ + dt¡1 + ³t.
In this appendix, the solutions given in equations (A.1) and (A.2) are explained in detail.
A.1 Calculating ¹ ¯











dt+i cannot be observed at time t, but dt is. Solving dt+i recursively yields:
dt+i = Ádt+i¡1 + ut+i (A.4)
= Á2dt+i¡2 + Áut+i¡1 + ut+i (A.5)





Recall that ut is a white noise variable (i.e. N(0;¾2)) and that the expected value (Et[¢])





j=0 Et[ut+i¡j] = 0.

















































= dt¹ ¯ (A.13)
Note that the sum converges as long as Á < 1 + r.
A.2 Calculating k
Obtaining the k parameter is very similar to calculating ¹ ¯. The only signi¯cant di®erence












Since log income °ows (dt) are assumed to follow a random walk process such that dt =











As in the prior case, dt+i cannot be observed at time t, yet dt is. So once again solving
recursively for dt+i one obtains:
dt+i = ¹ + dt+i¡1 + ³t+i (A.16)
= ¹ + ¹ + dt+i¡2 + ³t+i¡1 + ³t+i (A.17)
. . . (A.18)




























j=0 ³t+i¡j. Note that X is normal because it is the sum of normal variables
(³t is a white noise variable N(0;¾2)).
The log-normal distribution has the property that Et[eX], where X is a normal variable
with mean º and variance ¾2 is eº+¾2=2. Since the mean of each ³t is equal to 0, the mean
of X will be equal to 0 as well (i.e. º = 0). Given this, the variance of X will simply be the









and Et(eX) will be;
Et(eX) = eºX+¾2
X=2 = ei¾2=2




















































The sum converges as long as r > ¹ + ¾2=2.
27B Appendix: Calculating the Aggregate Price Index
The Aggregate Price Index (API) mentioned in Section 4 of this paper is a \new" series that
has only recently began to be calculated by the Financial Stability Department of the Banco
de la Rep¶ ublica (Central Bank of Colombia). This Appendix describes the methodology and
assumptions used in the construction of this index.
The API, in its shortest form, can be written as:
APIt = APIcs;t Á1 + APIhh;t Á2 + APIfs;t Á3 ;
3 X
i=1
Ái = 1 (B.1)
where APIcs, APIhh and APIfs refer to the aggregate price index of the private Corporate
Sector, Households and the Financial Sector. Á is the weight given to each sector and is
determined by the relative participation of each sectors' assets on total assets. The API for
each sector is de¯ned as:
APIcs;t = IPENt ±fa;t + IGBCt ±eq;t + IPTESt ±gb;t ; ±fa + ±eq + ±gb = 1 (B.2)
APIhh;t = IPV Nt ¯fa;t + IGBCt ¯eq;t + IPTESt ¯gb;t ; ¯fa + ¯eq + ¯gb = 1 (B.3)
APIfs;t = IPENt ³fa;t + IGBCt ³eq;t + IPTESt ³gb;t ; ³fa + ³eq + ³gb = 1 (B.4)
where IPEN is an index of new commercial, o±ce and warehouse constructions calculated
by DANE (Department of National Statistics) and IPVN is an index of new residential housing
prices calculated by DNP (Department of National Planning). Both these indexes are used
as the price of ¯xed assets. IGBC is the general equity price index calculated by the Bolsa de
Valores de Colombia (Colombian Stock Exchange) and IPTES is a price index for government
bonds calculated at Banco de la Rep¶ ublica44. The choice of simplifying each sector's assets to
these three types is based on actual price information availability (e.g. there is not a decent
price series for corporate bonds) and the fact that they represent a signi¯cant portion of each
sectors' assets45. All series used in the construction of these indexes are in real terms.
±fa, ±eq and ±gb represent the relative weights given to ¯xed assets, equity and government
bonds, respectively, for the corporate sector. The ¯ weights for households' API and the ³
weights for the ¯nancial sector's API are interpreted accordingly. Each weight is given by the
relative importance of each type of asset in the total assets of each economic sector.
The index was calculated on a monthly basis for the period 1994:1-2006:12. For the
purposes of this paper, the index was used on a quarterly basis, where each quarter corresponds
to the average of the three relevant months.
44The speci¯c index used in this paper is for in°ation-linked government bonds (called TES UVR).
45This is especially true for the ¯nancial sector and households, where these three assets represent more than
60% of total assets. In the corporate sector their participation falls close to 30%.
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